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Abstract
Structural  reforms are often designed to change the  methodology based  on the analysis of household  survey
prices  of key goods and services.  Since the overall  data to estimate the first-order impact of a variety  of
intention  of such reforms is  the reduction  of poverty, it is  structural reforms.  He also elaborates on the ways in
important to understand how the resulting price changes  which this methodology  may be extended  in a flexible
affect the poor. However,  organizations  seeking to  way to account for particular features of a country in
provide  timely advice to policymakers  in  developing  question.  Finally,  he  outlines the  direction of some
countries  often do not have the data and resources  extensions on  the approach  to tackle  dynamics,  risk, and
needed to undertake  the most sophisticated  approaches  qualitative  poverty analysis.
to such analysis.  McCulloch outlines a simple
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For many years there has been considerable interest in the impact of economic reforms
upon poverty and more generally on the distribution of welfare within society.  This
interest has arisen from a number of different  sources.  A large number of NGO and civil
society organizations,  along with many developing country governments have expressed
concern  about the potential negative distributional impact of structural reforms.  At the
same time much academic work has pointed to the wide variety of outcomes resulting
from reforms in different  countries.'
Economic reforms are typically split into two categories: macroeconomic  reforms, often
pursued under the auspices of the IMF;  and structural or price reforms designed to
improve resource allocation and increase efficiency.  Although the maintenance of
macroeconomic  stability remains the cornerstone of effective economic  development,
there has been a stronger emphasis in recent years on structural reforms since these are
key to achieving pro-poor growth.
Understanding  the impact of structural or price reforms on poverty is key in several
different areas of reform.  For example,  the imposition or removal of a tariff on the staple
food can have a major impact upon the incomes of the poor.  The same is true of a
reduction  in the transaction costs faced by the poor in reaching markets,  through for
example, investments  in rural feeder roads, policies to enhance competition in the
transportation sector, or marketing reforms.  Similarly utility reform and privatization
often have a dramatic impact upon the prices for such services and for poverty if the
purchase of such services is important for the poor.  And the same is true of changes  in
the wide variety of taxes and subsidies which may be imposed by the government.2 The
central characteristic  of all these reforms  is that they are designed to change prices and
thereby influence resource allocation to different activities.  Therefore,  for the purpose of
understanding the impact of structural reforms upon the poor, it is essential to have a
good methodology for linking price changes to changes in poverty.
The theoretical  framework for linking such reforms to poverty is probably best developed
in the area of trade (see Winters  (2000) and McCulloch,  Winters and Cirera (2001)),
although the approach is generally applicable to a wide range of price reforms.  The
analysis of the linkages between price reforms, including trade reform,  and poverty is
complex and there are a large variety of different methods  available (Reimer (2002) and
McCulloch,  Winters and Cirera (2001) provide reviews of methodologies and papers).3
In an ideal world the relationship  between price reformn and poverty could be accurately
predicted using a general equilibrium model with a suitably disaggregated household
'See  Cornia, Jolly and Stewart (1987)  for an early critique of structural  adjustment reformns.
2  See Ahmad and Stem (1991) for a comprehensive  review of the issues raised by taxation in developing
countries.  Deaton (1997)  provides a succinct statement of some of the methodological  problems.
3 See also http://wwwl.worldbank.org/wbiep/trade/poverty/papers.htni  for a selection of papers.  The World
Bank also provide a "toolkit" of methods for conducting poverty  and social  impact analysis - see
http://www.worldbank.org/poverty/psia.sector.  If the macroeconomic  and microeconomic  data required for such an approach are
available and reasonably accurate, the parameters of the model are empirically estimated
from the available data, and the functional  forms of the behavioural relationships  in the
model are broadly correct, then such models can provide useful ex-ante predictions of the
impact of price shocks upon different types of households  and thereby upon poverty.
Furthermore,  even where these conditions are not completly satisfied, CGE models can
provide a valuable indication of the sorts of effects which we might expect given any set
of assumptions about data, parameters and behavioural relationships  and thereby give an
indication of how sensitive the results are to particular sets of assumptions.
CGE models have now been used to examine the impact of a variety of price reforms
(including trade, marketing and shifts in agricultural technology)  in a large number of
different countries.4 However, the data requirements for such models can be
considerable.  Unless a recent Social Account Matrix (SAM) is already available, the
construction of a useable SAM can take substantial time and expertise.  Furthermore, the
econometric  estimation of behavioural  parameters (as opposed to merely calibrating such
parameters against the original SAM) can be complex and time-consuming  and the choice
of functional form for the behavioural relationships,  although based upon plausible
arguments, is essentially arbitrary (Deaton, 1997).
To reduce the data and resource requirements, many analysts have used simpler partial
equilibrium techniques  which can be implemented more quickly on readily available data.
Such analysis has typically involved detailed microeconometric  work on household
survey datasets.  This can yield information about the pattern of consumption  and how it
varies across different groups (e.g. deciles, gender of household head, type of main
activity, region etc).  In addition surveys sometimes have income information which can
tell us the relative importance of different sources of income again disaggregated by
different groups.  Such work can provide a rich picture of the poverty profile of any given
country and an initial indication of the likely impact of reforms.
This paper describes a simple practical methodology for estimating the poverty impact of
price reforms which can be implemented in a reasonably  short period of time using
almost universally available household survey data.  This methodology is not new, but by
providing a comprehensive description of the methodology in one paper, we hope that it
will become a standard "minimum"  analysis of the potential impact of such reforms upon
the poor.  We provide some examples of the application of the methodology from the
Diagnostic Trade Integration Studies conducted as part of the Integrated Framework
program5 to assist Least Developed Countries with integration into the world economy.
4  For example, IFPRI's Trade and Macroeconomic  division http://www.ifpri.orEI  has conducted numerous
studies of this kind.
5  The Integrated Framework (IF) was set up by the WTO Ministerial meeting in Singapore in 1996 to help
integrate  LDCs into the world economy.  The work programme includes  the preparation of country specific
Diagnostic Trade Integration  Studies some of which include chapters on the linkage between trade and
poverty (hilp://www.inte-ratedfraniework.org/)  provides more information  on the Integrated Framework.
DTIS studies for Cambodia, Madagascar and Mauritania are available  from
http://if.wto.org/documents  e.btm; draft DTIS studies exist for Yemen, Senegal,  Malawi  and Lesotho.
2In addition,  since the reforms which are likely to have the greatest impact upon the poor
will vary from country to country, we provide some pointers to how the analysis can be
made more sophisticated in the areas of most importance to a particular country.  We
conclude with a discussion of areas  for future research.
2.  A Basic  Methodology 6
The basic methodology draws on the approach of Nicita,  Olarreaga and Soloaga (2002) in
their study of the impact of trade reform in Cambodia.  They write the income of a
household as the sum of three components: own production, wage employment and net
transfers.  Own production includes both the value-added  from farming as well as the
value-added  from any other enterprises owned by the households (e.g. small enterprises
engaged in trading or the provision of services).  Wage employment includes all
payments made by those outside the household for the labour services of members of the
household e.g. payments for working on someone else's farm, or the payment resulting
from a job.  Net transfers refers to the net payments from the government (pensions,
grants and other transfers minus any fees or taxes) as well as net transfers from other
households e.g. net remittances.
The idea behind the methodology is that in the short run households cannot change their
activities in response to a change in prices (in the long run households may well change
their activities as a result of the price change - indeed this may be the intention of the
reforms).  In this case income from own production  and wage employment can be written
as the product of a set of prices and a set of quantities.  For example,  income from own
production is equal to the prices of the outputs produced times the quantity of output
produced minus the prices of the inputs used times the quantities of inputs used.
Similarly income from wage employment can be written as wages times the (net) quantity
of labour sold.7 If households are unable to change their activities immediately when
prices change,  then a first approximation to the change in their income resulting from a
price shock can be given by the sum of the price changes tirnes the original quantities
produced.  Thus if the rice price increases,  a first approximation to the increase in income
for rice farmers is given simply by the change in the rice price times the quantity of rice
produced.  Similarly if  the wage increases,  a first approximation of the benefit is given by
the change in the wage times the quantity of labour sold.
However, households  consume as well as produce and price changes affect consumption
too.  Just as with production, price changes will change the long run consumption pattern
Work has been initiated on Ethiopia, Burundi, Nepal, Guinea,  Eritrea.  A draft DTIS study has also been
done for Armenia  and work is underway in several low income countries  including: Georgia, Moldova,
Kyrgyz Republic and Azerbaijan).
6  The basic methodology  is based on "A simple methodology to assess the poverty impact of economic
policies using household data.  An application to Cambodia.  Nicita,  Olarreaga  and Soloaga (2002).  See
Annex  I for details.
7 Transfer income  is  harder to disaggregate in this way - see the section on remittances below.
3of households, causing them to consume relatively more of cheaper goods and relatively
less of goods which have become more expensive.  Also price changes will affect real
incomes making households consume more or less of all goods.  But, in the short run we
can make the same assumption  as for production - that the quantities of goods consumed
by the household do not change.  If this is the case then a first approximation of the
increase  in the cost associated with a price increase can be given simply by the change in
the price times the quantity of the good originally consumed.
Putting the production and consumption effects together,  it is possible to show that the
change in welfare8 can be approximated  as the change in income minus the change in
consumption.  This makes intuitive sense: an increase in the price of a good which is both
produced and consumed will increase income and also increase the cost of achieving the
original level of consumption - the difference between these is therefore an
approximation to the welfare  change.
Note that the basic methodology is a "worst case" analysis because it assumes no quantity
response at all - if households are able to substitute  away from the consumption of goods
whose price has risen or to substitute towards the production of such goods then it must
be better off than the situation in which it could not do so.  In some respects this makes
the simple model more attractive because if the model points to a relatively small
negative or positive impact then the incorporation of substitution effects can only make
the situation better.
Finally, if one wishes to express the change in welfare  as a percentage then one can divide
it by the original level of welfare (given by the initial level of income).  If we do this we
can write9:
AW  Awf  o)  Bk  ,  ]  I  -
E;  [  4  >  (  ( Apc X  (1) -ZBS~cj
where W is the measure of welfare, ISf indicates the value of outputj as a share of
household income,  (Ap°  /p7  ) is the percentage  change in the price of outputj, BSk' is the
budget share of input costs, ISjw is the income share of net factor income from factorf (in
most cases equal to the income share of wages), and BSjC is the budget share of goodj in
consumption.'0
8  Given by money metric utility - see Annex  1 for details.
9 See Minot and Goletti (2000)  Appendix 2  for a full derivation.
10 We also assume no change in transfer income  see Annex  1 for an expanded expression  with transfer
income.
4Equation (1) is the core of the basic methodology.  The key thing to note about this
equation is that the first-order percentage  change in welfare can be calculated using only
information on the income shares of different income sources, the budget shares of
different items of expenditure, and the percentage changes  in prices experienced.  Such
information is readily available from many household surveys making the application of
this methodology relatively straightforward  in a large number of countries.
3.  Application of the Basic Methodology
Given the above methodology, the impact of a price change upon a household will clearly
depend on two things: which prices change (and by how much); and the nature of the
household.  We consider each issue in turn.
Determining  price changes
The easiest way to "determine" price changes is to assume them.  That is, the above
methodology can be used to explore the potential impact upon different groups of
households of a set of possible price changes.  This is particularly valuable where the
price changes likely to result from the implementation of a reform are not known with
any degree of accuracy  (or where the analysis of how the policy reforms might change
prices is complex, costly or simply has not yet been undertaken).  Even where price
changes have been predicted by some other model, assuming  a set of exogenous price
changes allows policymakers to conduct  sensitivity analysis on the poverty impact of the
models predictions.
Rather than assuming exogenous changes in the prices faced by households,  one might
instead wish to assume exogenous changes in a  policy related price and some
transmission mechanism between the policy related price and the price faced by the
household.  For example, if  one is interested in the poverty impact of a 10 percent
increase in the rice tariff we could write down the price of tradable goods as a function of
the various taxes and costs which incur between the border and the household.  i.e.
ph = pW.(1  - t)  for output prices and
p  = p W.(
1 + t) for the price of  tradeable inputs and consumption goods  (2)
where ph is the price experienced  by the household, pW  is the world price and t is the
tariff, tax or unit cost between the border and the household.  If we know the world price
and the tax then we can calculate the percentage  change in the household price for any
change in the tax. 1  l Alternatively one could treat the tax as endogenous and use the unit
" In the simple case shown in equation (2) the percentage  change in the household price will be equal to
at  /(1  + t) where a is the percentage  change in the tariff on an input; or  - at /(1  - t) for an output.
5price experienced  by the household to calculate the total unit transaction cost between the
border and the household and then simulate a percentage reduction in this cost.
The more detail one has regarding the transmission of prices from the policy price to the
price faced by the household, the more accurately  one can predict the likely percentage
change in price faced by the household.  For example if information on transport costs is
available between different regions and one wishes to simulate the impact of a particular
infrastructure development  on the price of a tradeable good which is not produced
domestically then we can write:
Pr =p  *(1  + t)(1  + tr)  (3)
where  ph is the price faced by household h in region r, t is the tax at the border and tr is
the transport cost from the border to region r.  One may then use the information about
the different effects which the infrastructure development may have on transport costs
between the border and each region to determine the likely impact of the infrastructure
development on the prices faced by households in each region.
One may also simulate technological  shifts in the same way.  For example, Nicita,
Olarreaga and Soloaga (2002) write the value of rice output as:
Value of Rice Output  = q Paddy.(1-phlpaddy).A.  (I -a). (l  trice)  rice  (4)
Where qpaddy is the quantity of paddy produced, phlpaddY is the post harvest losses, A  is the
milling yield of paddy-to-rice, (1-a) is the milling unit transformation costs, trice is the tax
on rice and  price is the world price of rice.  They then simulate changes in technological
parameters  e.g. improved storage lowering post-harvest losses, improved efficiency
raising milling transformation or lowering transformation costs, as well as changes in the
tax rate (see Nicita, Olarreaga and Soloaga (2002) for details).
Similarly, if the price change is the result of changing a tax or subsidy applied by the
govemment on a particular good or service, then the simplest possible approach is to
assume that there is a proportional  increase in the consumer price, while the producer
price remains fixed.  If estimates of the own price elasticity of demand and supply are
available, then a better approximation to the effect upon consumer and producer prices
can be found by calculating the price at which the market clears when a wedge equal to
the tax is placed between the consumer and producer prices. 12
12 The percentage  change in producer prices will be given by Edt/(l  - Edt);  the percentage  change in
consumer prices will be given by E  t/(l -E  dt)  where  Ed  =  d/(s  -£  )  Es  =  /(£  - 8 )
6d  is the demand elasticity,  Cs  is the supply elasticity and t is the ad valorem tax rate.
6Thus there are a large number of ways in which one can derive plausible price changes
resulting from policy reforms.  However, the impact of these price changes upon the poor
depends on the nature of the household,  to which we now turn.
The Nature of  the Household
The impact of a price change upon a household will clearly depend on the relative
importance of different sources of income  and of different goods in the consumption
basket.  For example, if the price of a staple food rises sharply then net producers will
benefit, whereas net consumers will lose, but the extent of the gain or loss depends upon
how much income depends upon the production of this good and how important this good
is in the household's  consumption basket.  Consequently, the best place to start in
determining the impact of a price shock is to obtain, for different groups in society,
information about the relative importance of different sources of income and the relative
importance of different goods in household  consumption.  Table 1 shows a typical table,
from Cambodia, of sources of income for different deciles of the consumption
distribution;  Table 2 shows the expenditure shares, by decile of per capita consumption.
Table  1:  Contributions to income  in  Cambodia from different sources (percent)
Deciles
Source of Income:  1  2  3  4  5  6  7  8  9  10  avg
Self employment  67.8  71.4  71.7  70.3  73.6  68.5  71.2  70.7  63.3  36.3  60.9
* from cultivation  27.8  29.7  31.1  30.3  31.9  32.1  30.6  32.3  19.8  3.2  22.4
from rice cultivation  21.4  24.3  25.3  23.6  25.7  25.0  22.7  20.4  9.7  2.1  16.3
fromothercrops  6.4  5.4  5.8  6.7  6.2  7.1  7.9  11.9  10.1  1.1  6.1
* from livestock  16.6  14.3  14.2  13.0  12.4  11.9  11.6  12.0  8.3  1.5  9.4
* from fish growing, etc  6.1  7.1  5.5  8.7  6.9  6.8  8.7  7.1  5.2  2.1  5.6
* from forestry and hunting  8.3  10.2  9.7  7.3  7.7  7.9  8.1  6.1  4.9  0.6  5.7
* from non farming
activites  8.9  10.0  11.2  10.9  14.7  9.8  12.2  13.2  25.1  29.0  17.7
Other sources  32.2  28.6  28.3  29.7  26.4  31.5  28.8  29.3  36.8  63.9  39.1
* from wages  19.0  15.0  15.9  14.5  14.3  18.5  17.6  16.5  21.0  30.2  20.5
*  from remittances  1.2  1.9  1.6  2.8  1.3  2.4  1.6  1.7  2.3  2.6  2.1
* other (rents, dividends,
etc)  12.1  11.7  10.9  12.4  10.8  10.6  9.6  11.1  13.4  31.0  16.5
Total  100  100  100  100  100  100  100  100  100  100  100
Source:  CSES Survey 2001
Table 1 shows that income from self-employment  is the most important source of income
for the vast majority of the population,  only falling substantially below 70% of income
for the top two deciles.  Most of this income comes from cultivation, particularly rice
cultivation,  but livestock  and forestry products are also of importance to the poor.  The
7poorest decile obtain a higher share of their income from wages than all except the two
highest deciles, probably reflecting landlessness among the poorest households  in
Cambodia.  The most striking thing to note from Table  1 is the dramatic differences
between the top two deciles and the rest of the population.  The rich in Cambodia (and in
many other countries) really are different, typically earning a far higher share of their
income from non-farming activities, wages,  and rental income than the rest of the
population.  Given that the top two deciles of most populations tend to live in the major
urban centers and are much more closely connected to the policy process than most other
groups,  it is important to analyse policies to see if they are really serving the interests of
the majority of the population (and in particular the poor) rather than those of the, rather
different, top two deciles.
Table  2:  Expenditure  shares  in Cambodia  by decile of per capita consumption
(percent)
Consumption
item  1  2  3  4  5  6  7  8  9  10  avg
Food Total  75.7  76.3  76.0  73.7  73.7  72.6  72.0  70.3  64.4  38.6  63.5
*  Rice, all
varietes  28.4  23.3  22.7  20.7  20.6  18.9  17.5  15.1  12.5  5.8  15.6
*  Fish &  fish
products  9.9  11.1  10.6  10.5  10.9  10.8  10.0  10.0  9.2  5.0  8.9
* All other
consumption
items  37.4  41.9  42.7  42.5  42.2  43.0  44.5  45.2  42.7  27.8  39.0
Non Food Total  24.4  23.8  24.1  26.4  26.3  27.5  28.0  29.7  35.6  61.4  36.5
*  Housing, fuel
and
transportation a  15.7  15.5  15.2  17.1  17.3  17.4  17.5  19.4  24.1  46.7  25.5
* Clothing b  2.9  2.8  3.0  3.0  2.8  3.4  3.4  3.2  2.9  2.3  2.9
* Other
expenditures c  5.8  5.4  5.9  6.2  6.1  6.6  7.1  7.1  8.6  12.4  8.2
a Includes  house rent (rental  value of subsidized housing,  rental  value of owner-occupied  housing, hotel  charges),  house maintenance and
repair, water and fuel, medical  care, transportation and communication,  and personal care
b Clothing and footwear (tailored clothes, ready-made  clothes, shoes, etc.)
c  Includes  fumiture  and  household equipment  and operation,  expenditures  in recreation,  education , personal  effects  and  miscellaneous
items.
Source:  CSES Survey 2001.
Table  2 shows the expenditure  shares on different commodity groups  broken down by the
same per capita consumption decile groups  as above.  Again we see a remarkable
homogeneity across the bottom eight deciles and dramatic differences  for the top two
deciles.  Food expenditure  accounts for over 70% of total expenditure  for the bottom 80%
of the population, but rice consumption increases  in importance  for poorer households,
whilst the share of all other consumption items (except fish and fish products) declines.
Similarly non-food shares are quite similar for the bottom eight deciles, with the share of
housing,  fuel and transportation rising dramatically for the top two deciles.
8Taken together Tables 1 and 2 give us a good indication of the likely initial impact of a
given price shock.  Clearly changes in rice prices will have the largest impact given their
large share-in both income and consumption.  Of course what matters is the households
net consumption position; the tables suggest that the poorest decile will be net consumers
on average (28.4% of their consumption  is on rice, 21.4% of their income is from rice) as
are the top two deciles, whilst all other deciles are net producers.  Thus a sharp increase in
the rice price may hurt the poorest, but help the not quite so poor at the same time.  The
tables also give us insight into issues which might not otherwise be apparent.  For
example, decreases  in livestock prices could hurt the poor to a significant extent, but
would be of much less significance  for the upper deciles of the population.  Similarly
shifts in wage income will matter more to the poorest decile than to slightly less poor
households in deciles 2 to 5.  And increases in housing, fuel and transportation  costs will
hit the richest hard, but will have a much smaller effect upon the poorest 80% of the
population.  Thus  a careful examination of the income sources and expenditure  shares of
the population can provide much of the "story" about the potential impact of price shocks
upon the poor.
The ability to tell a relevant story about who is affected by various reforms also depends
upon the ways in which households are grouped.  Tables  1 and 2 grouped households  into
deciles of per capita consumption  expenditure, which is a natural grouping if one is
interested in determining the impact upon the poor.  However, deciles of consumption
expenditure are rarely a relevant group for policy purposes; rather policymakers tend to
be interested in what the effects of a reform are for functional or geographical  groupings
e.g. rice farmers versus informal urban workers  or Western province versus Eastern
Province.  Indeed there are an infinite variety of possible groupings  e.g. educational  level,
gender of household head, ethnicity,  location, principle activity,  land ownership etc.  The
particular combinations of grouping which are relevant will depend on the precise
context, but if the analysis is conducted at the household level, then it is possible to put
together any grouping for which the relevant variables  are available from the survey data.
Furthermore,  if one wishes to explore non-income  "dimensions" of poverty (e.g.
educational  attainment, remoteness, health etc) and these variables are available in the
dataset, then it is possible to present the above tables in terms of deciles of these
variables.  Table 3 for example, breaks down households' income sources in Nepal by
deciles of time to get to the market.  It shows for example that income  from own
enterprises  is only of real importance to households who are relatively close to markets,
whilst consumption of own production increases  as a proportion of total income the
further away one is from markets, rising to over half of total income for the most remote
three deciles.
There are many different dimensions across which such tables may be constructed.  For
example, Table 4 shows household income share for each of the 10 geological and
economic regions of Nepal along with summary poverty and illiteracy figures for each
region.  It shows large differences in sources of livelihood between different regions.
Income from own enterprises  and non-agricultural  wages  are key in Kathmandu  and other
9urban areas, whereas in Terai and the Hills and Mountains,  own production is the most
important source of income.  Even within broad geographical regions there are substantial
differences: in rural eastem and central Terai almost a fifth of income comes from own
enterprises, whereas in mid- and far-west Terai only 4% of income comes from this
source.  Similarly remittances  are key to those living in the rural western hills, but mostly
irrelevant to those in the eastem hills.
Table 3: Household  income sources  by time to market in Nepal
Deciles of Distance to Market
Share of Income  Closest  2  3  5  6  7  8  9  Distant
Decile  Decile
cash  wages from  2.1  3.9  8.8  8.1  6.6  7.0  8.9  6.4  5.4
working in others farm
Otherwages  18.0  13.8  13.7  15.9  11.2  8.5  8.2  11.6  16.1
Land rent  1.8  0.6  0.7  1.1  0.6  0.1  0.1  0.2  0.1
net agricultural  income  1.8  3.7  7.7  10.7  10.2  3.7  6.8  4.4  1.5
from sales of crops
net livestock income  1.5  2.0  3.6  3.8  3.9  3.3  3.6  4.1  5.8
net income from own  48.2  29.7  13.1  7.0  8.2  15.4  5.6  10.1  5.1
enterprises
total net remittances  7.1  20.3  9.4  5.8  12.7  8.4  14.3  8.6  8.3
other income  8.1  6.0  3.2  1.4  2.9  4.6  2.2  2.6  2.6
consumption of own  11.4  20.0  39.7  46.2  43.7  49.1  50.4  51.9  55.0
production
total income  100.0  100.0  100.0  100.0  100.0  100.0  100.0  100.0  100.0
Source:  Baris Sivri - personal communication.
Table 4: Household  income sources  and poverty by region in Nepal
Ru
Urban  Rural  Rural  Rural  Rural  Mid a
Kathman  Rural  Rural  Rural  Mid and  Eastern  Cental  Western Far-Wt
du  Other  Eastern  Central  Western Far-West  Hills,  Hills,  Hills,  Hil
Share of Income  Valley  Urban  Teral  Terai  Terai  Terai  Mtns  Mtns  Mtns  Mt
cash wages from working in
others farm  2.4  1.8  10.6  10.1  8.0  10.2  3.6  4.5  6.3
Otherwages  12.6  20.1  12.3  12.3  8.3  9.2  12.4  12.6  9.0  1
Land rent  0.0  1.7  0.9  1.5  0.1  0.6  0.2  0.0  0.1
net agricultural income from sales
of crops (sales-expenditures)  5.6  1.2  17.4  7.9  6.0  15.8  5.1  1.3  2.0
net livestock Income  10.3  2.0  2.4  3.9  3.7  0.5  6.1  3.8  1.9
net income from own  enterprises  40.4  44.5  19.3  17.2  10.9  4.0  5.9  31.2  10.7
total net remittances (received -
sent)  4.3  10.0  6.1  9.8  7.8  4.4  1.1  9.5  22.0
other income  7.4  7.9  2.0  0.9  2.6  0.6  3.6  1.4  8.3
consumption of own production  17.0  10.7  29.0  36.4  52.6  54.7  62.0  35.7  39.7  5
total Income  100.0  100.0  100.0  100.0  100.0  100.0  100.0  100.0  100.0  10'
Poverty incidence (%)  *  4.0  34.0  42.0  38.0  40.0  53.0  28.0  67.0  40.0  7:
Povertygap  0.00  0.11  0.10  0.08  0.09  0.13  0.07  0.11  0.13  0.
Illiteracy (%)  24.0  45.0  62.0  77.0  69.0  72.0  59.0  66.0  54.0  7:
Share in Nepal Population (%)  1.4  6.8  12.6  16.2  7.2  6.7  9.7  13.1  13.0  1
Source: Baris  Sivri - personal communication.
10Constructing such tables can thus give a good indication of how groups of households
differentiated by dimensions other than income will be affected by reforms.
Once such tables have been constructed the basic methodology outlined above can be
applied to calculate the impact on each household.  This has been done using data from
several different countries and a wide variety of policy experiments.' 3 Table 5 provides
an example of a typical  set of results based on the simulation of a 10 percent increase in
the price of rice in Cambodia.
Table 5:  Effect of a  10 per cent increase in  the price of rice, by docile, as per cent of
total household expenditures,  Cambodia
Decile (7
1  2  3  4  5  6  7  8  9  10  TOTAL
Urban
Net Sellers  1.9  2.8  3.2  3.5  2.9  2.9  1.7  2.2  1.8  5.7  2.5
Net Buyers  -2.2  -1.5  -1.7  -1.5  -1.5  -1.3  -1.2  -1.2  -1.0  -0.6  -1
Total Urban  -1.3  0.5  -0.4  -0.3  -0.5  -0.1  -0.1  0.3  -0.2  -0.3  -0.2
Rural
Net Sellers  2.2  2.6  2.4  2.4  2.9  2.8  2.4  2.3  1.4  1.9  2.4
Net Buyers  -1.9  -1.4  -1.1  -1.2  -1.2  -1.2  -1.2  -1.2  -1.0  -0.7  -1.3
Total Rural  -0.4  0.5  0.7  0.8  1.1  1.0  0.9  1.0  -0.1  -0.5  0.6
Net Sellers  2.2  2.6  2.4  2.5  2.9  2.8  2.4  2.3  1.5  3.8  2.5
Net Buyers  -1.9  -1.4  -1.1  -1.2  -1.2  -1.2  -1.2  -1.2  -1.0  -0.7  -1.2
Total  -0.5  0.5  0.7  0.7  1.0  1.0  0.8  0.9  -0.1  -0.4  0.5
(*) Deciles by per capita total consumption
Source:  Nicita, Olarreaga  and Soloaga  (2002)
The results show that the main losers from a rice price increase would be the poorest net
buyers in urban areas (because they spend a large proportion of their income on rice),
whilst the largest gainers would be the net sellers in the top decile of the urban areas.  In
rural areas the gains among net sellers are more evenly distributed, but the losses are still
concentrated  among the poor due to their large expenditure share on rice.
As noted above, there are a large number of different simulations which can be done with
the above framework.  For example, Ajwad, Duygan and Sivri (2002) simulate the impact
of a 25% reduction in transportation costs for farmer households on household
consumption in Armenia.  They estimate that rural households gain on average 0.95% of
total per capita expenditure, compared  to 0.  1% for urban households, but the gains are
reasonably evenly spread among the poor and the non-poor.  They also simulate the
impact of a 10%  increase in irrigation charges; this hurts both urban and rural households
by roughly the same extent on average, but poorer rural households  are hit much harder
than well off rural households because a much higher share of their expenditure is on
irrigation.  Similarly Ajwad, Aksoy and Sivri (2002) simulate the poverty impact of a
30% increase in tobacco  and maize yields in Malawi.  The simulated increase in tobacco
yields raises incomes of the poorest quintile by 1.5%  compared to 0.99% for the top
1' See poverty chapters of the Diagnostic Trade Integration  Studies for Cambodia, Mauritania,  Madagascar
and Senegal and drafts for Malawi, Lesotho,  Yemen and Armenia.
11quintile; but raising maize yields has a dramatic  impact upon the poor, raising their
incomes  by 5.66% compared  to just 0.5% for the best off.
Applying the basic methodology in this way thus provides a valuable first estimate of the
potential effects of a reform.  However, the results of such simulations are contentious
because they do not allow producers or consumers to respond to changed prices.  Possibly
more serioiisly they ignore the role of labour markets; the above simulation must, by
construction,  giVe the result that net consumers of a product whose price falls will gain.
However, there is some evidence that households who are net consumers of a staple food
do not necessarily  gain when the price of that food falls if they obtain much of their
income from working on farms producing that good, because  the reduction in profits for
the farm owners results in downward pressure on wages or employment.  The next section
shows various ways in which the methodology can be extended  to address these and other
concerns.
4.  Extensions  of the basic methodology
The above approach to the analysis of the impact of structural reforms on the poor is
attractive because its data requirements  are relatively low; most reasonable  income and
production  surveys will contain data on quantities produced,  inputs used and income
received  from a variety of different  sources.14 However, it has a number of important
weaknesses.
Firstly, the model does not allow for substitution in consumption or production.  In reality
quantities will adjust (indeed the reallocation of resources may be one of the objectives of
the reforms).  Resources  will shift into the production of goods whose prices have
increased,  and away from the use of inputs and the consumption of goods whose prices
have gone up.
Secondly,  the model does not include any markets.  Prices are completely exogenous and,
unless changed for the purpose of the simulation, remain fixed.  Yet in many cases prices
will be determined by markets; in particular changes in the demand and supply of labour
will determine the real wage of unskilled labour - a key variable for understanding  the
poverty impact of a reform.
Thirdly, the model does not allow for growth.  Yet promoting growth - particularly
growth which includes the poor - is often the central aim of such reforms.  Allowing the
model to incorporate  assumptions about growth can be important  for simulating medium
to long-run impacts.
14  However, even here there may be difficulties:  price information is often not well recorded (often one has
to rely on unit prices rather than community price surveys); similarly wage information is often absent so
that wages have to be inputed from earnings  and hours worked;  and transfers data  often gives no indication
of the source of the transfer (what sector was the person working in) or the determinants of the size of the
transfer.
12We consider each of  these areas below.
Substitution in consumption and  production
To allow for substitution in consumption one needs to obtain at least income and own-
price (and preferably also cross-price) elasticities of demand.  The easiest way to obtain
these is to draw them from existing studies of the country of interest.  Alternatively, one
could attempt to estimate commodity demand equations using one of the standard
demand systems (LES, AIDS, AIDADS etc).  Ideally time series data on demands for
various goods, prices and incomes is needed to ensure a reasonable amount of variation in
prices.  Alternatively,  one may use Deaton's method of exploiting spatial variation in unit
prices to estimate own and cross-price elasticities (see Deaton and Grimard,  1992;
Deaton,  1997).  Nicita (2002) provides an example of the application of this approach to
Mexico.
Estimating these elasticities provides a partial equilibrium way of assessing the
magnitude of "second round" consumption effects of  price reforms.  However, estimating
such elasticities is not a trivial matter, especially if only cross-sectional  data are available.
Moreover,  it is not clear that incorporating the ability to substitute in consumption is that
important.  When prices change simultaneously  for a large number of commodities,
incorporating the ability to substitute in consumption appears in many practical
circumstances  to make little difference to the overall welfare effects.  This suggests that it
may only be worth the additional effort of estimating such elasticities if one has a
particular reason for believing that consumption substitution  effects are likely to be
important.  On the other hand, if reasonable consumption elasticities are already readily
available from other studies, their incorporation  within the above framework is
straightforward  (see below) and there is no reason for not doing so.
To allow for substitution in production  one could attempt to estimate output supply or
factor demand equations.. As with estimating consumption demand systems, this requires
one to make assumptions about the functional form of the output supply/factor demand
functions, and there must be a reasonable amount of variation in prices in the data.  Again
the easiest approach is to draw the resulting  supply elasticities  from existing studies.  If
these are not available then time series data is needed on outputs, prices and factor
demands.  Alternatively,  one may attempt to estimate elasticities  by combining cross-
sectional  and time-series data (see Mundlak (1963)), but estimating such elasticities
solely from cross-sectional  data is particularly difficult for agricultural production
because natural conditions also cause large variations in supply.  Furthermore,  estimates
of supply functions tend to assume smooth substitutability between the production of
different commodities whereas  in fact the major welfare changes may occur when
markets are created or destroyed as a result of reforms.  Such discontinuities  are not
generally captured in traditional supply systems.
13Does the incorporation of such supply elasticities matter?  In the short-run it may be
reasonable  to suppose that changes in the activities undertaken  by households may be
relatively slow (certainly compared to changes in consumption),  so that the short-run
poverty impact may justifiably assume fixed quantities of production.  However, data
from numerous countries suggest that households tend to be much less diversified in
production than in consumption, so that reforms which change the returns to different
activities are likely to have much larger welfare effects than reforms which change the
prices of goods which households consume.  Certainly, long-run supply response is
critical to long-run poverty alleviation,  so the incorporation of long-run supply elasticities
in calculations of the poverty impact is probably much more important in most cases than
the incorporation of consumption elasticities.
Even if it is not possible to estimate a full supply or demand system, it may still be worth
incorporating reasonable  estimates of the own-price  demand and supply elasticities for
the goods which are subject to price changes since a range of plausible values is more
likely to reflect reality than assuming that all elasticities are zero.  These elasticities may
be easily incorporated within our simple framework by amending equation (1).  Each
element of equation (1)  consists of an income or budget share (ISj or BSj) multiplied by a
percentage price change (Apj /p.).  Incorporating price elasticities into this equation
simply involves replacing each BS1.(Apj  /pi)  term with
>j2
BS1. 2  +'BS(  (2)
where 6j is the relevant own-price  demand elasticity for goodj (and similarly for the
income share terms and the own-price elasticity of supply ).15
Modeling the labour  market
Assuming that quantities remain fixed (and therefore that only wages adjust) is especially
problematic  for the labour market since it is equivalent to assuming a labour supply
elasticity of zero.  In reality the price and cost changes induced by reforms will make
some activities more profitable and others less so; demand for labour in the benefiting
sectors will rise increasing both employment  and wages, whilst demand in the losing
sectors will fall reducing employment and wages.  If adjustment is smooth and
instantaneous  then there will be no net effects upon employment and the effect on wages
of different types of labour will depend on the relative intensity with which they are used
in the gaining and losing sectors.  However, in many circumstances  adjustment is far from
smooth or instantaneous.  Companies losing from reforms may simply be unprofitable
15 The superscripts  from equation (1) have been ormitted since this expression applies to all elements  of that
equation (except rernittances).  See Minot and Goletti (2000) for a derivation.
14and close, shedding large numbers of  jobs; if employment in the affected sector
dominates the local economy then this can have large negative  externalities on other
businesses.  Enterprises in the sectors gaining from reforms may be located in different
places and draw upon a different pool of labour.  Thus although the national aggregate of
employment may be little affected by reforms, local effects can be considerable and
longer lasting.
The opposite extreme from assuming a zero wage elasticity of labour is to assume that it
is infinitely elastic implying that, if a sector expands, employment tends to rise rather than
wages.  In some sectors and countries  this may be nearer the truth than assuming  a zero
elasticity (the empirical evidence  is mixed - see the survey by Matusz and Tarr (1999);
Winters (2002) presents evidence that employment adjusted more than wages in India
during the 1990s).  In practical terms it may be sensible to take into account the
segmented nature of many labour markets in developing countries, since the simplest
assumption of an infinitely elastic labour supply suggests somewhat unrealistically  that
the "wage" when out of work is exactly the same as the wage in employment.  It may be
better to assume that employment  expands in the gaining sectors at the existing sector or
location specific wage.'6
If we assume that employment expands  at a fixed sector specific wage and wish to
simulate the impact of an increase in demand then we need a way of moving people into
and out ofjobs.  It is clearly rather unrealistic  to suppose that all of these new jobs will be
filled from the ranks of the previously unemployed; in many cases people will switch
from one job to another in order to take advantage of the differences in sectoral wage
rates.  Nicita et al (2002) provide a useful approach to calculating who is likely to gain
from an expansion in employment.  They calculate the probability of being in different
forms of employment using a multinomial  logit, rank households according to these
probabilities and then put them into jobs in the order of their probability.  This approach
fits nicely with the intuition that, when formal sectors grow it is often not the poor who
get the jobs, or at least not at first.  In addition, if the new wage "allocated" to a
household on getting a job is determined by a wage equation which takes into account
sectoral wage differentials then it will be possible for there to be discrete changes in
income when a person gets a job.
This approach has been applied in the Integrated Framework studies for a number of
different countries.  For example,  the study for the Republic of Yemen (2002) simulates
the impact of a 6 percent increase in female participation in the labour market.  Since
poorer households are more likely to participate in the labour market in Yemen, two-
thirds of the households  affected by the increase  in employment opportunities  are in the
bottom three expenditure deciles.  Furthermore, the average impact for those households
that have a new entrant to the labour force is equivalent to 30 percent of total household
expenditures.  Similarly in Malawi, Ajwad, Aksoy and Sivri (2002) simulate the poverty
impact of a 30% increase in employment  in manufacturing,  construction  and mining.
16 Or at least that the formal sector  wage is higher than the subsistence  wage.
15Because of the characteristics  of those 'employed in these sectors they find that this large
increase in employment has no effect upon the poorest quintile, whilst the richest quintile
gains by 4%.  In Cambodia, Nicita, Olarreaga and Soloaga (2002) show that the impact of
an increase of 50,000 employees  in the industrial  sector would have a large positive
impact on rural households in the lowest expenditure decile with at least one member
switching to the sector.  But because of the relative probability of  obtaining such jobs, the
overall benefit to rural households is lower than the gain experienced  by urban
households.
A similar but somewhat more sophisticated methodology is used by Bourgignon and
others in micro-simulation  models of distribution changes (Bourguignon,  Foumier et al.
2000).  Bourguignon et al. estimate an individual level wage equation correcting for
selection bias using the Heckman method.  They then estimate wage and farm labour
participation  equations  sequentially for each member of the household  (starting with the
household head) as a multinomial logit choice between  (i) inactivity (ii) wage work (iii)
work on the family farm (iv) work in non-farm businesses and (v) a combination of (ii) &
(iii).  The multinomial logits incorporate variables reflecting household  characteristics
which may have an influence upon individual participation decisions.
The advantage of both of the above methods of modelling  employment and wage income
is that they only require readily available household survey data.  In particular all that is
needed is information  on employment by sector, wages  (or employment income and the
quantity of labour supplied) and household characteristics.  Using only this information  it
is possible to "allocate"  individuals to jobs and determine their likely wage, given a
known increase or decrease in employment.  However,  the extent of the employment
change is exogenous usingthe above approach.  Ideally, the expansion or contraction of
each sector resulting  from reform could be predicted by a general equilibrium model, but,
as noted  above, the resources required to construct  a CGE model may preclude this option
in many countries.  One therefore needs a mechanism for estimating the potential
employment  impact of a structural reform. There are two components  to this problem:
firstly, it is necessary to estimate the impact of the price change  induced by reform on
sectoral  output; and secondly it is necessary to estimate the impact of the change in output
upon employment and wages.
One ad hoc  approach to the first part of the problem would be to use investment climate
surveys to obtain estimates  from senior managers of companies  in each sector about the
sort of growth rates they anticipate and what difference they might expect policy reforms
to make.  Such estimates are of course highly subjective at an individual level, but
assuming that knowledge of the prospects for growth is reasonably common across each
industry, aggregate  estimates of growth expectations may be at least as accurate as
historical or model based estimates.  Furthermore, if detailed firm-level  surveys are
available it may be possible to cross-check  whether growth expectations  are "reasonable"
given the margins and financing  structure of firms within the industry.
16Alternatively, if estimates of aggregate supply elasticities are available, then these may be
used to estimate the impact of price reforms on the output of affected sectors.  By its
nature this approach will not take into account general equilibrium effects, but if  the
reforms do not affect too many sectors simultaneously then this may provide an adequate
approximation of the output change.
Estimating the impact of the change in output upon employment and wages can be
addressed  in a number of ways without resorting to a CGE analysis.  If the sector of
employment  is indicated in the household  survey, then it is possible simply to scale
employment up or down by the sectoral growth rate (if one is assuming an infinite
elasticity of labour supply) or to scale wages up or down for existing employees (if one is
assuming that the labour supply elasticity is zero).
If it is reasonable to assume excess capacity and unemployment so that exogenous
changes can be satisfied  through an increase in output without having any effect on
prices, then a slightly more theoretically defensible  approach  is given by Niimi,
Vasudeva-Dutta  and Winters (2002).  They attempt to estimate the employment impact of
the growth in exports and imports in Vietnam between  1993 and 1998 using the Vietnam
Input-Output matrix.  They simply calculate labour coefficients  for each sector (in terms
of  jobs per $ of output) by dividing the total labour cost in each sector by the value of
gross output (to give labour cost per $) and then dividing by the average wage.'7 Using
this approach one can simulate the employment  impact of any assumed sectoral  growth
rate by simply-multiplying the change in output by the labour coefficient for the sector.
For example Niimi, Vasudeva-Dutta  and Winters (2002) multiply the labour coefficient
for each tradable sector by the change in exports to calculate the addition employment
created by the expansion of exports.  Similarly the employment "destroyed" by the
expansion of imports was calculated by multiplying  the labour coefficients by the changes
in imports.  This approach provides a lower bound of the employment changes resulting
from growth."8
Simply using the labour coefficients from the 1-0 matrix assumes that there are no
second-round  expenditure  effects associated with the demand  for intermediates  (or that
all intermediates are imported).  Where the production of intermediate inputs is an
important part of the local economy one may wish instead to use "total labour
coefficients" which take into account the effect of growth on the demand  for
intermediates  (see Niimi, Vasudeva-Dutta and Winters, 2002).19  This provides an upper
bound of the employment changes.  Of course the lower and upper bounds  are rather
crude approximations  to the employment changes, but the advantage of this approach is
that it only requires an Input-Output  matrix (and preferably information about sectoral
wage rates).
17 Ideally the average  sectoral wage should be used, but in their case this was unavailable.
18  Assuming no changes in wages.
9 This is similar to the technique of using Social Accounting Matrix (SAM) multipliers  to simulate the
impact of exogenous  income shocks upon different household groups - see Decaluwe, Patry, Savard and
Thorbecke  (1999)  for an excellent  exposition.
17Analysing Remittances
Finally, in many countries remittances form  an important part of income for many groups
of households.  If this is the case then one needs to think about the determinants of
remittance income since it is not satisfactory to treat them as exogenous.  There are a
number of ways in which this might be done.  At the very least, if one has estimates of the
sectoral growth rates likely to result from reform (or a set of scenarios about what such
growth rates might be), and if the sectoral source of the remittance is indicated in the
data, then it is straightforward  to scale up or down household remittance incomes
accordingly.  This is similar to the inelastic  labour supply assumption above in that it is
assumed that the wage  rises in the growing sector benefiting existing employees and
therefore increasing remittances.  To account  for the idea that growing sectors will
employ new people who may then remit income it may be better to estimate the
probability of receiving remittances  from different sectors  and the level of remittance
received/sent  against a set of household characteristics  (see Republic of Yemen (2002)
for an example).  Then one can scale up or down employment in the different  sectors
using the probability of involvement in exactly the same way as suggested for labour
income above.
This simple approach does not take into account the fact that whether households have
remittances often depends on an earlier decision by one or more household member to
migrate in search of work.  If data are available on sectoral employment and wage rates as
well as the characteristics  of those employed,  then it is possible to adopt a somewhat
more sophisticated  approach by modeling the decision to migrate.  Consider a simple
model of a household with n adult members - nr are in the rural household (which is
receiving the remittances),  nu are in the urban area sending remittances.  For simplicity
say that the members in rural areas are guaranteed a return on their labour of wr, whereas
those in the urban area may receive  a higher return wu but with a probability that depends
upon overall labour demand and their individual characteristics.  Assume each household
maximizes its household income  (i.e. the total income of its members in both the rural
and urban areas).
In this simple model, maximizing income  simply involves deciding how many people to
send to the urban area to try and get a job.  If the sectoral wage and the way in which the
probability of getting ajob depends on characteristics  is known, then each household can
allocate the optimal number of people to finding employment in the urban area.  In the
case of households with members with "poor" characteristics,  it may not be worth their
while sending someone to get a job, but if, for any household member
wU.Prob(Employment)  > wr,  then sending that member to obtain employment will
increase  expected household income, and, if the household is risk-neutral, its welfare.
Finally, if a household does send one or more members to the urban area to obtain
employment, then one has to determine how much remittance income they will send
back.  One approach is to assume (or calculate from the data) an average saving rate and
assume that they remit a fixed proportion of their income.  An alternative  might be to
18assume a "social compact" within the household that the migrant would not live at a
higher per adult equivalent level of consumption than the members of the sending
household  i.e. that they would remit that amount which would make them as well off as
the receiving household (after taking into account the remittance).
If one were to exploit a simple "Harris-Todaro"  model of this kind, estimating the returns
to different activities  and the parameters  of the probability of employment from the data,
then it should be possible to simulate the impact of growth in a-particular sector upon the
supply of migrant labour and therefore upon the level of remittances, whilst taking into
account the loss of income resulting from their departure from rural areas.  Annex 2
elaborates on the simple model and describes how this might be implemented  in practice.
Modeling the Household
The sections above have described ways of separately incorporating  quantity responses
into each element of income  and consumption i.e. production  and consumption
substitution,  expansions or contractions of labour employed,  and shifts in remittance
income.  However, in practice these responses happen simultaneously within the
household.  It would be useful therefore to have a mechanism for modeling the impact of
price changes upon households when they are allowed to simultaneously respond by
changing production,  consumption and labour sale decisions  to maximize their overall
welfare.  This suggests the use of simple "household models" in the Singh, Squire and
Strauss (1986) tradition.  Such models assume that households are faced with an
exogenous set of prices but can re-allocate their resources between different activities to
maximize overall household welfare.  IFPRI have developed a sophisticated non-
separable farm household model (Lofgren  and Robinson,  1999) to explain non-linearities
in the supply response of households to a variety of policy reforms.  Their approach is
quite data and resource  intensive.  However,  it is possible to construct a very simple
version of their household model which allows one to take account of household level
responses.  Consider the following  simple model:
Equation  Example
1. Utility  U  (qc
2. Production function  qx =a(
f
3. Commodity balance  qi  +qi  = qi  +Eqi  +qi
4. Factor balance  qf  +qf  P = lqf  l + X
195. Cash constraint  EpPqq  + IpJqjP  =Z  p  qS  + Ipqff
f  i  f
Say that a household maximizes their utility (given here by a simple Cobb-Douglas
function of the goods which they consume)  subject to a set of constraints.  The first
constraint is the production technology which they have (given above by a simple Cobb-
Douglas function of the primary factors); the next two constraints  are simple commodity
balances  - the quantity of any commodity produced plus the amount purchased must
equal the amount consumed plus the amount used as inputs and that sold - similarly the
total endowment of a factor which the household may have plus that which is purchased
(e.g. labour hired in) must be equal to that used in production and that sold; finally, the
household  is subject to a cash constraint  so that its total purchases of commodities and
factors cannot exceed the value of its sales of commodities and factors.20
Given a set of exogenous purchase and sales prices for commodities and factors (if
necessary unit prices from the household survey may be used), households will choose
how to allocate their factors between different activities in order to maximize their
incomes, consumption and utility.  The model requires a small set of parameters (the ai,
ai, and i,  for each commodity i and factorj)  which can either be taken from existing
studies or estimated from the data.  It is therefore possible in principle to construct a
"household level" SAM  for each household in the dataset and to estimate the impact of a
price shock on household behaviour for each household separately.
Table 6 gives an example of a simple stylized household SAM.  This household
undertakes  two activities -subsistence crop production and cash crop production.  These
activities use labour, land and capital as well as fertliser.  These activities "sell" their
output to the commodity accounts  (SUB-C and CASH-C) respectively.  In addition the
commodity accounts "import" some of the subsistence crop from the "Rest of the World"
(recall that this is a Household level SAM so that the Rest of the World (ROW) here
simply means all other households; "imports"  in this context are simply purchases  from
outside the household)  as well as fertliser and non-food commodity.  The household  also
sells their output of the cash crop to the ROW - their cash constraint means that the value
of their imports (subsistence crop, fertiliser and non-food) must match the value of their
exports (cash crop).  The household's  endowment of labour, capital and land "pays" the
household  account which then spends its income on food and non-food.
In a practical example the household may have many more activities and there will be
many more commodities.  In addition, if the data allows, factors of production can be
broken down (e.g. by gender,  age, experience,  education etc).  The model may also allow
some factors to be tradable (e.g. labour) whilst others may not be (e.g. land).  More
significantly,  the determination of whether a commodity or factor is tradeable can be
endogenous.  Our model allowed the possibility of differences in the purchase and selling
20 For simplicity we have set up the commodity and factor balance  constraints and the cash constraints  as
equalities - it is possible to specify them as inequalities so that not all factors or commodities have to be
used.
20prices arising from transaction costs.  This can result in households  choosing not to trade
goods which, were such transaction costs reduced they would trade.21
It may not be realistic to construct a full household level SAM for every household in the
dataset (although this is not impossible - indeed Cogneau and Robilliard (2000) and
Robilliard, Bourguignon  et al. (2001)  have embedded all the households in the survey
into a full country level  CGE).  However,  it is relatively straightforward to construct  a set
of SAMs for "representative  households" and estimate the impact on each of these
representative households separately.
The household modeling approach  has the attraction that it can allow for all the above
substitution effects within a consistent theoretical  framework, whilst only requiring
information typically available from a household  survey.  However, it has the important
disadvantage of remaining a fixed price model.  Indeed it is perfectly possible for each of
the representative households simulated to simultaneously supply more labour to the
market  as a result of a structural  reform without this having any effect upon the wage.
Similarly household production responses change the supply and demand for
commodities in the economy, but, in these household models this has no effect upon the
prices of these commodities.  In some circumstances this does not matter - if prices are
likely to remain fixed or if the nature of the changes can be assumed exogenously then it
is not necessary to complicate the model by incorporating  assumptions about the ways in
which markets clear and prices adjust.  However, in other circumstances  accounting for
the likely changes in the prices of some key commodities (notably staple foods)  and some
key factors (notably the unskilled wage) is important.  One way in which these can be
accommodated without moving to a country level CGE model is to employ a multi-
market model.
21  More precisely, production and consumption  decisions become non-separable  so that the household is in
fact responding to an endogenously  determined shadow price rather than to the market prices.
21Table 6: A Stylised Household  SAM
Activities  Commodities  Factors  Household  ROU Total Supplylincome
1  3  4  5  6  7  8  9  10  11
Activities  SUB-A  CASH-A  SUB-C  CASH-C  INPUT-C  NONFC  LAB  CAP  LAND  HH  ROW
1. Subsistence activity SUB-A  40  40
2. Cash crop activity  CASH-A  75  75
Commodities
3. Food crop  SUB-C  60  60
4. Cash  crop  CASH-C  7  75
5.  Fertiliser  INPUT-C  10  20  30
6.  Non-food  NONF-C  25  25
Factors
7.  Labour  LAB  10  2  30
8. Capital  CAP  10  2  30
9. Land  LAND  10  1  25
Household
10. The household  HH  30  30  25  85
Other institutions
11.  Rest of the World  ROW  20  30  25  75
Total Demand/Expenditure  40  7'  60  75  30  25  30  30  25  85  7
Expenditures  go from column to row (or equivalently, sales go from row to column).  The row totals therefore represent the income of each account; column
totals represent total expenditures of the accounts.
22Multi-Market Models
All the above assumes that prices are exogenous.  In some circumstances  this may be
reasonable - such as homogenous tradeable  goods whose price will be determined by the
world price.  But the literature on growth linkages (Haggblade,  Hazell et al.  1989; Hazell
and Haggblade  1991) points clearly to the fact that many of the goods which matter to the
poorest people are non- or at least not very readily tradeable.  In such situations prices are
going to be determined by local market clearing.
Multi-market models model the impact of household  supply and demand decisions upon
the prices of key commodities and thereby on household income  (see Braverman and
Hammer (1986) for an early exposition; Arulpragasam and Conway (2002) provide a
practical guide to the use of such models).  Rich and Lundberg (2002) describe the
application of a multi-market model to the analysis of policy reforms in Malawi.  Their
model contains explicit  supply and demand equations for a limited set of commodities
using supply and demand elasticities  estimated from previous studies.  However,  the key
difference  from the household model above is the inclusion of a set of price equations
linking domestic producer and consumer prices for each commodity with import and
export prices given estimates  of various transport and transaction  costs and taxes.
Producer and consumer prices are then made endogenous by the inclusion of a market
clearing equilibrium equation which ensures that the overall supply and demand for each
commodity is equalized.  Household agricultural income is determined by the value of the
commodities produced by each of four household types minus their costs of production;
non-agricultural  income is exogenous to the model.
Minot and Goletti (2000) present an interesting variation of this approach by constructing
a spatial multi-market model for Vietnam.  This is similar to the model of Rich and
Lundberg but with a number of innovations.  Most significantly  they estimate supply and
demand elasticities  for several  different regions of the country, rather than for different
household groups.  Markets  in their model follow rules of spatial arbitrage - that is, trade
between two regions occurs when the price difference between them reaches the transfer
cost (the full cost of transporting  and marketing the good from one region to the other).
The model generates estimates of the impact of changes in transaction costs and export
quotas upon production,  consumption and prices of a set of commodities  as well as
average  incomes in each region.  In order to estimate the distributional and poverty
impact of these changes, the price changes predicted by the model, along with the
estimated supply and demand elasticities, are applied to household data on production
and consumption to predict the change in net income for each household using the basic
methodology described  above.
Multi-market models  are a useful tool for the analysis of reforms if those reforms are
likely to give rise to supply and demand responses which may significantly.change  prices.
However, multi-market are heavily dependent on being able to obtain reasonable
23estimates of income and price elasticities of demand  and supply elasticities.  Furthermore,
multi-market  models, like the household model described above, have no factor markets
(indeed, unlike the household  model above, they have no factors at all since income is
determined by the value-added  of own production).  It is therefore impossible  to examine
the impact of supply and demand responses on the wage.  Indeed non-agricultural  income
is often exogenous and models where this is the case are clearly not appropriate  for the
analysis of situations in which non-farm  income is important.  Given that the
consumption of non-tradable services in rural areas can be extremely important (Hazell
and Hojjati 1995) this is a particularly serious omission, although there is no reason in
principle why non-tradable  services cannot be added as a commodity within a multi-
market model if suitable data are available.  Nonetheless, multi-market models can be
valuable if endogenous price changes resulting from responses in several different
markets is likely to be the main driver of welfare changes.
Allowing for Growth
The omission of growth from the basic methodology  is a particularly serious omission
because the size of the impact  on poverty resulting from  a typical simulation which does
not incorporate growth tends to be rather small.  Consider a large shock such as a 50%
increase in the price of rice in Cambodia.  Table  1 shows that rice production is 21.4% of
the income of the poorest decile; Table  2 shows that rice consumption is 28.4% of their
expenditure - thus their net consumption of rice is 7% of their income.  Thus the
percentage change in net income of the poorest decile when faced with this large shock
will be at most 3.5% of their net income  (7%  times 50% price change).  Furthermore,  if
poor households  are able to adjust at all, either by producing more rice or consuming
other foods, then the impact on their net income will be less.  Of course this is an
aggregate  figure - individual households  or groups of households may be more severely
affected - but the fact remains that the aggregate impact (positive or negative) upon the
poor from such simulations tends to be rather small.
The generally small value of predicted impact is in direct  corntrast with the claims of two
different actors in the process of reform.  Activists, NGOs and organizations representing
those most severely affected often claim that the negative effects from structural reforms
are large; whilst governments  and international organizations  often claim that the benefits
from such reforms are large.  These differing perspectives can be understood when one
allows for  aggregation  and growth (Kanbur,  2001).  For example, claims of strong
negative effects on some groups are often true - some households or groups can be badly
hit by particular reforms - but when the impact on such groups are aggregated along with
the smaller negative or positive impact on other households the overall effect can be quite
small.  Resolving this is a political rather than an economic  issue - policymakers need to
decide on the extent to which policy should be detennined by its impact on the worst
affected as against the impact on the general population.  Claims of strong positive effects
from structural reforms usually rely on (sometimes  correct) assumptions about the impact
of reform on growth.  In the medium to long-run the impact of enhanced productivity and
24growth on poverty tend to dominate the impact of redistribution caused by reforms (see
Demery, Sen and Vishwanath,  1995), and poverty can be substantially reduced if reforms
actually do have the assumed impact on growth.
How might one incorporate growth within our simple methodology?  In the absence of a
model linking policy reform to sectoral growth rates one is forced to rely upon projections
based upon historical performance.  It is straightforward to incorporate a steady reduction
in particular transaction costs, or productivity growth in line with that experienced  in the
past (see World Bank (2001)).  Furthermore, if separate studies give some indication of
how such parameters may be changed by policy reforms then these new values may be
used instead.  Certainly this approach leaves much to be desired, but it does have the
advantage that, since the "growth" rates are exogenously determined,  it is possible to
conduct sensitivity analysis  so that policymakers can see the likely distributional outcome
for any set of growth rates which they deem to be plausible.
5.  Other Ideas for Methodological  Development
In the longer term there are a number of other ways in which the analysis of the linkages
between structural reforms  and poverty could be improved.  I have grouped these under
two themes: dynamics and risk; and qualitative approaches.
Dynamics and Risk
Poverty is not a static phenomenon.  A large number of studies from both developed  and
developing countries show that there is a great deal of movement in and out of poverty
(see Baulch and Hoddinott (2000) for a selection of papers on poverty dynamics in
developing countries).  However, much "poverty profile"  analysis is based upon static
regressions between income/consumption  and a set of household and economic
characteristics.  Unsurprisingly we find that the poor have high dependency ratios, are
poorly educated, have few assets and live in poor areas - in other words, they are poor!
However, the policy implications resulting from such associations are much less clear:
"removing"  children or the elderly from households with high dependency ratios is not a
policy option; neither in most cases is supplying significant private assets to poor
households, while the problems  associated with "moving" households to better areas are
well known.  Education is a key policy option, but even here, it is not certain that, if
everyone's educational level rises, the poor will be much better off, even if they are better
educated.
Interventions  based upon such static analysis may therefore be less effective than
expected  in reducing poverty.  If, instead we think of poverty as a dynamic process, then
the "equilibrium" poverty rate can be reduced either by reducing the probability of falling
into poverty, or by increasing the probability of exiting poverty (or both).  For example, if
25the most important reason why households  fall into poverty is illness of a major income
earner in the household,  then appropriate primary (and curative) health care can be
prioritized;  similarly if the principle reason for exiting poverty is obtaining a job, then
employment creation can be emphasized.  It is therefore important  that poverty analysis
should attempt to understand the most important reasons for falling into and exiting from
poverty.  In particular, it is important for us to know the extent to which price reforms are
a cause of entries into or exits from poverty.
How might this analysis be done?  When there is only one survey available for a country
there is little that can be done.  This said, it is astonishing that household surveys in
addition to collecting large quantities of quantitative data about the status of the
household don't also ask the simple qualitative question "what happened?".  Households
that have fallen into poverty usually know why - analysis of this qualitative information
would be extremely valuable and it is important that future surveys conducted should
provide for a mix of quantitative and qualitative information about causality.
In some situations we do have more than one survey - usually for different years, but
sometimes within year.  In this situation there is a lot that can be done.  Where the
multiple surveys are repeated cross-sections, these are typically used to look at aggregate
trends in poverty.  However, they also offer the possibility of understanding  something
about the dynamics of poverty by examining pseudo-panels.  For example,  one might
look at how different cohorts have fared, possibly disaggregated  by region, sector or skill
(see Deaton (1997) for a discussion and application of the methodology).  Although the
extent of disaggregation may be limited by the need to maintain reasonable  standard
errors, such analysis can be very useful in painting a picture of how different groups in
society have actually fared as a result of known price shocks.  Credible explanations of
what has actually happened in previous reform episodes can be more convincing to
policymakers  than simulations based upon single snapshots  in time.
Furthermore, in a handful of cases panel data is available.  In these situations much more
comprehensive  analysis of the impact of economic reforrns is possible.  The classic
methodology is outlined by Dercon (2000) for Ethiopia.  But panel data sets are available
and have been analysed for Peru (Glewwe  and Hall 1998), Zimbabwe (Alwang,  Mills et
al.; Hoddinott, Owens et al. 1999), South Africa (Carter and May, 2001), China (Jalan
and Ravallion  1998), India (Walker and Ryan  1990), Pakistan (McCulloch and Baulch
2000) and Vietnam (Niimi, Vasudeva-Dutta and Winters, 2002).  In other cases intra-
annual panels may be available (i.e. the same households were recorded at multiple times
during the year, but households are different across years).  Thus, in addition to exploring
how poverty has changed between years, using the intra-annual data to "correct"  for
seasonality,  it may be possible to analyze how seasonality itself moves people into and
out of poverty within the year.  Seasonality is well documented as one of the most
important concerns of the poor (Narayan, Chambers et al. 2000) and since the seasonality
of price variation arises precisely because of the lack of suitable behind-the-border  trade
institutions  and policies (warehouse receipting systems, buffer stocks, etc), understanding
26the way in which these price changes impact upon poverty can give valuable insight into
the poverty effectiveness  of behind-the-border  trade interventions.
Closely related to the issue of poverty dynamics and the impact of shocks is the issue of
risk and uncertainty.  Sometimes economic policy analysis ignores the substantial risk
aversion of poor households.  However, providing security is a central pillar of the WDR
2001  approach to poverty reduction.  The reason is quite clear; poor households not only
have less - they are much more vulnerable to being in poverty in any given year.  They
consequently make great efforts to minimize this vulnerability and these efforts can
undermine  their ability to benefit from reforms and their long-run growth.  For example,
poor households sometimes plant lower yielding but more drought resistant crops despite
the fact that they could substantially increase their incomes with higher yielding crops if
they had an effective means of dealing with the risk of crop failure.  Thus tackling issues
of risk and vulnerability in the analysis of structural reform and poverty helps to link such
reforms more closely to the social protection policies which form a key part of many
PRSPs.
There are a number of ways in which an analysis of risk may be undertaken.  Firstly, in
many cases surveys record both consumption and income.  In cases where there is just
one survey it is useful to look at how much narrower the cross-sectional  consumption
distribution is than the income distribution.22 Where a panel (or pseudo-panel)  is
available it is possible to calculate the extent of consumption smoothing as well as the
degree of persistence in both consumption and income.  Studies which have done this
have shown that the poor are, unsurprisingly, rather less well insured than the better off
(Jalan and Ravallion,  1999).  However,  this begs the interesting policy question - what
sorts of interventions are likely to affect the vulnerability of households to poverty, given
that domestic institutions can be important indirect providers of social protection  (e.g.
agricultural marketing boards which provide guaranteed prices, or enterprises providing
transfers to existing and former employees).  In order to answer this question it is
necessary to have a measure of vulnerability.  Several people have constructed
vulnerability measures (see Christiaensen and Boisvert 2000; Pritchett, Suryhadi et al.
2000; McCulloch and Calandrino 2002) and then attempted to understand the
determinants of vulnerability.  An analysis of how reforms affect  vulnerability could
therefore enrich the analytical  framework used above.
A second, more comprehensive  approach to incorporating  risk into our analysis, would be
to incorporate  a stochastic  element into the household modeling approach discussed
above.  Household models provide solutions for the optimal allocation by households of
the productive factors  at their disposal.  Including risk in such models would allow one to
capture the idea that households tend to allocate resources in order to maximize the return
to and minimize the risk from their entire "portfolio" of activities.23 Such a model would
22 Although the difference  will be a mixture of consumption  smoothing and differences  in measurement
error variances between consumption and income.
23 More precisely one might model them as maxirnizing their expected utility taking into account their risk
aversion.
27allow one to simulate the impact of reforms which changed the volatility of prices.  For
example, the removal of a variable rate tariff is likely to create greater domestic price
volatility than previously (along with a change in the average price).  A model which
incorporated risk could analyse the impact of both these effects upon poverty and
vulnerability.
Qualitative Approaches
The above discussion has focused on technical economic methodological issues.
However,  as WDR 2001 stressed, poverty is about much more than just income and
consumption so it is essential to take a multi-dimensional  approach to poverty analysis.
A multi-dimensional  approach does not necessarily mean a qualitative approach; other
dimensions of poverty can be quantified and analysed using the same tools as those
applied  to income and consumption.  For example, there is no reason why one cannot
report educational  level,  access to medical facilities,  distance from markets, extent of soil
degradation  etc by decile or plot their cumulative  distributions just as is done for income
and consumption.  Furthermore, several surveys contain subjective measures of wellbeing
and almost all surveys contain information on assets and durables enabling the
construction and comparison of welfare indices based on these variables (see Sahn and
Stifel (2000)  for an example using the Demographic and Health Surveys in Africa).
However,  aside from the technical literature,  there is a vast amount of qualitative
literature on poverty and the impact of reform on poverty in developing countries.  Such
material does not have the advantages of quantitative surveys  in terns of providing a
statistically representative picture of a whole country.  But it can provide enormously
valuable insights into the processes  of destitution, the structural  social relationships
which provide the context in which economic  activity takes places, the nature and
functioning of key institutions, the dynamics of intra-household  and community
behaviour,  the political processes which determine the success of reform, and much more.
Of particular importance is the role which qualitative studies can place in uncovering the
causal pathways through which reforms may influence different dimensions of wellbeing.
For example, if a reform increases the price of a cash crop typically produced by women,
but social norms dictate that women are also responsible for household maintenance and
childcare then the reforms may simultaneously increase incomes and reduce the welfare
of poor women due to the additional pressures on their time.  Quantitative household
surveys rarely capture such processes making it important to perform analysis using both
quantitative  and qualitative sources.24
One key resource here is the large volume of participatory material which is now
available on many countries.  In situations where quantitative  surveys are of debateable
quality, such participatory analyses  can provide key information on the relative
24 See (Kanbur, Chambers  et al.  2001)  for a collection of notes on mixing quantitative and qualitative
approaches.
28importance of different sources of income to different groups within the society.  Also,
although it is difficult to obtain good measures of the level of welfare from participatory
assessments making comparisons across groups difficult,  such exercises do generally
provide useful indications of the direction of changes in welfare  over time.  They can also
provide information  about: the key causes of poverty; the dimensions of poverty which
matter to the poor in that country; the nature  and extent of the risks faced by the poor; the
policies and institutions  which have the largest impact upon their lives; the role and
timing of seasonal shocks;  the agro-climatic  conditions faced by different groups  and so
forth.  They can therefore provide  a valuable input into the analysis of the impact of
structural reform on poverty.
Summary and Conclusions
This paper has outlined a simple methodology for linking structural reforms and poverty
using household survey data from developing countries.  As is always the case, the nature
of the appropriate model for analyzing such linkages must depend upon the precise
question being asked and upon the data and time resources  available.  If the intention is to
analyse the short-run impact of exogenous price changes, then the basic methodology,
which assumes that all quantities remain fixed, can be used to provide a first-order
approximation  to the likely change in net income for each household.  Furthermore, if the
nature and size of the transport and transaction costs determining producer and consumer
prices are known then it is possible to simulate the impact of exogenous changes in these
costs.
If it is desired to look at the medium run outcome of such exogenous policy changes then
it is necessary to account for the possibility of substitution in both consumption and
production.  Ideally this should be done by the econometric estimation of price elasticities
of supply, and income and price elasticities of demand if suitable data are available.  If
this is not possible within the available time or data constraints, then estimates can be
selected from other studies of the same or "similar" countries, or, at worst, parameters can
be chosen which reproduce the observed output levels given an assumed functional  form.
Experience  from several countries suggests that many households tend to be more
specialized in production than in consumption, so that the incorporation of substitution
possibilities in production has a greater impact upon the final results than the
incorporation of substitution in consumption.
In many circumstances,  households earn an important share of their income from the
labour market.  The basic methodology's  assumption of fixed quantities may not always
be appropriate  here, since exogenous price shocks resulting from reforms may give rise to
changes in employment levels in different sectors  rather than only changes in wages.  If
excess labour means that it is reasonable  to assume that employment can change without
changes in wage rates and the sector of employment  is indicated in the household survey
data, then employment can be scaled up or down by the sectoral growth rate.
29Alternatively,  labour coefficients from an input-output matrix may give an indication of
the employment changes  resulting from exogenous  changes in output.
If employment changes  can be calculated  or assumed, then it is still necessary to allocate
(or take away) the jobs to individuals.  Here it is possible to draw upon the household
survey data to estimate the probability of an individual being employed in a variety of
different activities based upon their characteristics  and those of their household.  In this
way one may account for the fact that the growth resulting  from a reform may not directly
benefit the poor if there is no corresponding rise in the unskilled wage.
Similarly,  in circumstances  where remittance income is important  it may be desirable to
have a somewhat deeper analysis of the impact of reform from this source.  If estimates
are available for the sectoral  growth rates likely to result from the reform and the sector
source of remittance  income is known then it is possible to scale up or down household
remittances pro-rata.  Alternatively, one may estimate the probability of receiving
remittances based upon household characteristics  and increase  or decrease employment
(and therefore  remittances)  on this basis.  Better still, if suitable data are available,  it may
be possible to model the decision to migrate based upon the expected remittance returns
and then simulate the change in income resulting from a shift in the probability of
employment in particular sectors.
One may also attempt to integrate  the above extensions of the basic methodology  in the
form of a simple household model.  Such  a model can allow  a household to allocate  their
resources  between a number of different activities (including wage labour) in order to
maximize their utility when faced with an exogenous set of prices.  One can then simulate
the manner in which households  change their resource allocations when prices change  as
a result of reform.
Alternatively, if reforms are likely to give rise to supply or demand responses with
significant knock-on effects for domestic prices, then it is possible to endogenise the
process of price formation through the use of a multi-market model.  However, such
models can require substantial additional data and resources  and are often inappropriate
for analyzing circumstances  where non-agricultural  income is important.
Other potential methodological  developments include greater attention to the dynamics of
poverty and the ways in which reforms may cause entry into or exit from poverty.
Furthermore,  with suitable data it may be possible to simulate the impact of structural
reforms on price volatility and the consequential  impact upon household  vulnerability.
Efforts may also be made to analyse the quantitative aspects of non-income dimensions of
poverty.  However a proper analysis of the linkages between reform and other dimensions
of poverty will require an exploration of the qualitative poverty material  in each country.
All of the approaches  described above have focused on ex ante prediction of welfare
effects resulting from structural reforms.  This is, of course, what policymakers are most
30interested in.  However, it is worth noting that ex ante analysis can also be usefully
informed by the application of the same techniques  ex post to see if the predicted effects
actually did occur.  Such ex post analysis can point to weaknesses in the modeling
methodology  and provide information  on the relative importance of different effects upon
welfare, allowing future modeling to take these into account.  More generally, it is
important that the effects of structural reform are monitored during implementation  and
adjustments  made if it becomes clear that the predicted  and actual effects are far apart.
In conclusion, the choice of technique for modeling the link between structural reforms
and poverty  should be determined by the precise nature of the question, the data available
and the characteristics  of economic activity and poverty in the country in question - there
is no single "best" model.  This paper has presented  a basic methodology which can be
applied using only household survey data and limited time resources,  along with a set of
elaborations upon this methodology which may be adopted as circumstances  and
resources dictate.
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34Annex  1:  The Basic Methodology25
The basic methodology draws on the approach of Nicita, Olarreaga and Soloaga (2002) in
their study of the impact of trade reform in Cambodia.  Let the income Y of a household
be given by:
Y=(Jp5q5 -Ep'q'  +EwfLf +EITmn  (1)
j  ~  ~k  f  m  n
where  p,. is the price of output j;  qo is the quantity of output j;  p'  and  qk  are the
corresponding  input prices and quantities;  wf is the wage rate for factorf, Lf is the net
sale of factorfby the household;  and Tmn  is the net transfer received by household
member n from source m.
Note that the first term in equation (1) is the value-added of all production (whether from
farming or non-farm  enterprises).  This includes both marketed production and own
consumption.  The second term is the value of net factor sales by the household - in the
case of most poor households this simply means net labour sales (i.e. employment income
minus payments for hired labour) since the only factor which most poor households can
sell is their own labour.  The final term represents the net transfers received by the
household.
Similarly we can write the consumption of the household simply as:
C = Ep  qic  (2)
where pc is the buying price of good i and  qc is the quantity consumed of good i.  Note
that  qc includes own consumption as well as goods purchased from the market.
It is then possible to simulate the impact on household income of  price changes induced
by structural reforms.  In the short run we can assume that all quantities  remain fixed so
that
AY=  EjAp5'  q'  ^Ap'.q  + EAwf  f  + E  Tm  n  (3)
j  kr  f  m  n
Similarly the change in consumption assuming that quantities remain fixed is
25 This methodology  draws heavily on "A simple methodology to assess the poverty impact of economic
policies using household data.  An application to Cambodia.  Nicita, Olarreaga and Soloaga (2002).
35AC = EApc.qc  (4)
It is possible to show that a first-order  approximation of the change in money metric
utility resulting from a change in the price of a commodity  can be given by26
AMMU  =  Y -AC  (5)
This makes intuitive sense:  an increase  (say) in the price of a good which is both
produced and consumed will increase income and also increase the cost of achieving the
original level of consumption - the difference between these is therefore  an
approximation  to the welfare change.
Note that we can combine equations (1), (2), (3) and (4) to write equation  (6):
M=BS° Ao  EBS'  APk  +ZBSw+  m  _  __  B  SC
110  k+  fi  p1
where BSjo indicates the budget (or income) share of output revenue in total income, BSj'
is the budget share of input costs, BSjW is the income share of net factor income from
factorfJ  and BSjC is the budget share of good] in consumption.  Thus the first-order
percentage change in net income can approximated by the budget shares of income and
expenditure  on each item times the percentage changes in prices experienced.27
26  See Chen and Ravallion (2002)  for an exposition of the theory.
27 See Minot and Goletti (2000) Appendix 2 for a full derivation.
36Annex 2: Modeling  Remittances
The paper outlines a number of ways in which we might model remittances.  This note
elaborates on the suggestion in the paper that we should attempt to incorporate  a simple
Harris-Todaro model of the migration process.
Imagine that a reform  gives rise to growth in employment in a particular sector.  Our
"standard" technique  for allocating people to jobs is to:
1.  Estimate a probit for participation  in the labour force
2.  Estimate a multinomial logit for sectoral participation (including unemployment
as base category)
3.  Allocate individuals to the labour force according to their probability of
participation  from the Probit analysis (leaving in individuals who are currently
participating even if their probability of participation is low)
4.  Allocate new entrants to the labour force to the sector which they are most likely
to participate in according to the multinomial logit (one could also  allow existing
employees to switch sector).
To tackle remittances we could replicate this approach using a Probit on receiving
remittances,  a multinomial logit to determine the sector of remittances received and a
level of remittances regression to determine the amount.  However, as argued in the
paper, this ignores the fact that sometimes a household has made a prior decision to
migrate in order to receive remittances  - certainly there is something  strange about just
giving a household a new remittance without the household having done anything or
given anything up.
Instead we may build a little Harris-Todaro  module into our standard methodology as
follows - the first three steps are the same as above i.e.:
1.  Calculate  the probability of getting employment (in any sector) using a Probit
model
2.  Estimate a multi-nomial logit to get the probability of being employed in each
sector (relative to the base category of being unemployed)
3.  Estimate  sectoral wage equations (or at least one wage equation with sectoral
dummies).  (Alternatively use information  on sectoral wages or unit eamings if
wages are unavailable, but wages are preferable).
In addition we then:
4.  Do a regression of household (NB not per capita) income on household
characteristics  including household size (or other demographic  categories); predict
the household income, and then predict the new household income when you
remove one household member - do this for each adult household member.  Take
the percentage  change in income resulting from the removal of the household
member and multiply this by the actual household income - this is an estimate of
the income loss associated with that individual migrating for employment.
5.  Calculate the expected income of the migrant individual as:
37E[ymig ]  (1  - Pr(Job))wj  (A2. 1)
where Pr(s)  is the probability of being employed in sector j; Pr(so) is the probability
of being employed in the base category (the multinomial  logit predicts this ratio);
Pr(Job) is the probability of having a job in any sector (predicted  from the Probit
regression);  and wj is the estimated wage for sector j.
Now let us define the following variables:
0 yn  is the original household income of the household with n members
yn  1l  is the household income reduced by the estimated loss of income resulting
from the migration of one individual
Yn 1l+  is the household income reduced by the estimated  loss of income resulting
from the migration of one individual, but with the remittance received by
the household added
Yn l+  is the household income reduced by the estimated  loss of income resulting
from the migration of one individual and with the whole value of the
income received by the migrant added (NB the subscript is n indicating
that it is the income of n individuals)
The original income is known; step 4 above estimates  yn11; and step 5 allows us to
calculate  Ynl+ (by simply adding the expected income of the migrant onto  yn 1).  The
only remaining question is how to calculate  yn.
One simple approach  is to estimate a savings rate ax.  An alternative  approach is to
assume a "social compact" between the household sending the migrant and the
migrant such that they will live at the same per capita income level.  If we assume that
the migrant sends a share a  of their income then we have:
n-I Yn-l  + a  m  1a)yg  (A2.2)
which implies that
38a  =n1)  - n  (A2_3)
In either case Yn  can then be calculated as:
yn-l  =  yn-l + a.mym  (A2.4)
Once the above y variables have been calculated  it is possible to calculate  the level of
household welfare with migration.  However,  this depends upon our unit of analysis.
There are two values which we could take:
a) if the household includes the welfare of the migrant then household welfare can be
calculated  as:  y- 1 +In
b) if the household only considers the welfare of the remaining members then welfare can
be calculated  as:  y-'+  /(n -1)
Rather than choose between these options we simply refer to the welfare level of the
household with and without migration  as Wl  and W° respectively.  We might therefore
expect households to send a migrant out for employment if E[W']  > W°.
Note that we can calculate both with and without migration values before any reform
takes place as well as after any reform.  To make the distinction clear we therefore refer
to: 
2 8
Before reform  After Reform
Without migration  WWR
With migration  WIR
Since  WOR  and  WBR  can both be calculated before reform it is possible to put the
households in the survey into  four groups:
i.  Households who don't now receive remittances and would not benefit from
migration ( WBR  <  WBR)
ii.  Households  who don't now receive remittance and would benefit from migration
(WBR  > WBR)
iii.  Households who do now receive remittance and would not benefit from migration
(WBR  < WBR)
28 For notational convenience  we drop the expectation symbol on the W'  variables.
39iv.  Households who do now receive remittance and would benefit-from migration
(WBR  > WBR)
In the case of group i, households behave in exactly the way we predict since it is not
worth their while sending a migrant in search of work.  Similarly the third group also
behaves as predicted - these are households who are already receiving remittances but for
whom it is not worth sending a migrant.  This might be because  the characteristics of the
remaining family members make their expected income from migration less than their
income loss resulting from migration;  or it may be that the existing source of remittance
is not due to migration but from some other source. However,  for groups ii and iv we
predict that it would make sense for households to send a migrant and yet they do not do
so.  This suggests that there may be unobserved costs or constraints to such migration for
these households.  It will be necessary to take into account these constraints when
analyzing the impact of reform below.
The Impact of Reform  on Poverty
We can now consider the same two types of reform which were described in the paper
under modeling labour incomes namely exogenous wage increases and exogenous
employment  increases.  As before, the choice of whether wages or employment  adjusts to
reform depends upon ones assumption about the elasticity of labour supply.
Wage changes:
As before the impact of exogenous wage changes is easy to calculate by simply applying
the assumed percentage  increase (say) in wage income to the individuals who work in the
affected sector.  Similarly a wage increase for migrant workers can be simulated by
increasing  the remittance income  for households receiving remittances  from the affected
sector.
However, this simple approach doesn't give the full story when we consider the migration
model.  Wage increases increase the expected value of income for a migrant as shown in
equation (A2. 1).  This will increase the number of households for whom sending a
migrant will beneficial.  If we simply simulate the impact of a wage increase by
increasing the wages of those currently in employment assuming that there is no increase
in unemployment then all of these additional migrants will, by assumption, be
unsuccessful  in obtaining employment.  This could even lead to a fall in welfare as
migrants are lured by higher wages into unemployment in the urban areas.  One way of
ensuring that outcomes  for migrants are consistent with their expectations is to allow all
jobs in the urban areas to be reallocated to existing employees and migrants according to
their probabilities of getting ajob in the sector.  This will have the result that some of
those currently employed will become unemployed, but will ensure that some of the
migrants obtain jobs.29
29 This is done using the original Probit and multinomial logit distributions  and allocating the fixed number
of  jobs according to the probability of getting a job in the sector as before.  One could then re-estimate  the
Probit and multinomial logit to obtain a new distribution which will accurately reflect the lower standards
required to obtain a  job (or the higher probability of getting  a job with any given set of characteristics).  If
40Employment changes:
Employment changes can be tackled in a very similar manner to the way in which they
are dealt with when modeling labour incomes.  Specifically we use the following
procedure:
1.  As for wage changes, calculate the expected values of welfare after reform with
and without migration  (W1R  and WOR).  The household sends a migrant if the
expected value of welfare with migration  WAR > WAR .
2.  Calculate the probability of each local individual and all the migrants sent being
employed  in each sector and allocate individuals to jobs in order of their
probability until all the available jobs have been filled.31
3.  If the individuals employed are local, then this simply contributes  to the labour
income of their household.  If however, they are non-local then their income
contributes to the remittances received by the household according to the fixed
saving or social compact rule described above.
4.  Calculate the household's  ex post welfare  WA.  This is the level of welfare when
one knows whether the migrant actually obtained a job.
In this way we can incorporate rational decisions by households regarding migration and
remittances into our simple model of the impact of reform upon poverty.
jobs were then reallocated to all households  according to their probability of employment in each sector the
new distribution should (on average)  generate  the correct fixed number of jobs.  Of course, the reduced
probability of obtaining a job will reduce the number of migrants  in the long run - we are interested here in
relatively short run effects  so we assume that information about the wage increase travels quickly and
therefore influences migration decisions first, whereas information on the gradually increasing probability
of obtaining employment travels more slowly.
30 Altematively one may wish to take into consideration the unobserved costs of migration mentioned
before.  This can be done by assuming that households who would have benefited from migration (groups  ii
and iv) but who did not do so, are unable to send migrants, so their welfare level remains at  WO  even if AR
> W 0 A further issue is who within the household is sent.  It is assumed that the household member
resulting in the highest expected value of WAR  is sent - this may not necessarily be the member with the
highest probability of employment, since the household will also take into account the loss of income
resulting from their departure.
3' A choice will need to be made here between allocating the new jobs simply to people who do not
currently have jobs accordingly to their probability of employment; or allocating people with the highest
probability to jobs (if they are made better off by switching)  and then filling the jobs which they leave with
others accordingly  to the same process.  Also, as  for wage  changes, one may wish to re-estimate the
probit/multinomial  logit once the additional employees have been added to reflect the increased probability
of obtaining a job.  Here we assume that employment expansions draw from the existing labour force whilst
information about the increased probability of employment takes time to filter back to migration decisions.
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